CHRONOLOGY OF THE BATTLE OF HUE
(January 31-February 25, 1968)
Nguyen Ngoc Bich
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January 31 2:00 am
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Attacks from the West and Northwest
0200 - The Communists opened the battle of Hue with a mortar and heavy artillery (122 mm rocket) bombardment hitting the command post of ARVN First Division (in Mang Ca Fort), the command post of Thua Thien Military District, the Dong Da Training Center and ARVN 7th Cavalry Battalion in An Cuu.
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2:33 am
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0233 - The ground assaults started with a 4-man sapper team, in ARVN uniforms, killing the guards at the Chanh Tay (West Gate, F) of the Citadel and opening the gate. Upon their flashlight signals, lead elements of Col. Nguyen Trong Tan's Sixth NVA Regiment entered the Old City, also known as the Citadel.
The 800th and 802nd Battalions, who earlier came down from the A Shau valley, poured into the Citadel, with the aim of taking Tay Loc Airfield (16o28'35"N 107o34'7.8"E), the First ARVN Division headquartered at Mang Ca Fort, and the Imperial Palace.
Altogether, according to Communist accounts, three NVA battalions (K-1, K-2, K-6) with elements of the 12th Sapper Battalion were involved on this front, with local militia elements acting as guides.
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At Tay Loc Airfield, ARVN's "Black Panther" (Hac Bao) Company, reinforced by the First Division 1st Ordnance Company, stopped the 800th NVA Battalion. "The heavy enemy [ARVN] fire enveloped the entire airfield. By dawn, our troops were still unable to make headway."
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While the fighting for the airfield seesawed with the ARVN first having the upper hand and then the Communists, the 802nd Battalion struck the First ARVN Division at Mang Ca. The NVA battalion managed to penetrate the division compound but an ad hoc 200-man defensive force of staff officers and clerks staved off the enemy assaults. General Ngo Quang Truong called back most of Black Panther Company from Tay Loc Airfield to bolster the headquarters defenses.
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2:30 am
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Also around 0230, after having crossed the Perfume River, a battalion of NVA Ninth Regiment (E.9), 309th Division, was in An Hoa village with the aim of engaging ARVN's Airborne Battalion 2, commanded by Major Thach. However, earlier in the day, Thach's battalion was already ordered elsewhere. The NVA took hold of the Bach Ho Bridge, blasted a span of the bridge to prevent reinforcements from crossing the river.
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January 31
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Attacks from the Southeast
Two NVA battalions (Battalions 416 and 418), which came through Dong Xuyen, My Xa, down La Van Thuong, took possession of the Dong Ba Gate (B).
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A NVA force known as "Route 12" came from Phu Thu and Dap Da. It crossed the Truong Tien Bridge and took hold of Thuong Tu Gate (A).
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January 31
3:40 am
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Attacks from the South
In the early hours of the morning, the NVA hit the US-MACV compound with mortar and rocket rounds before the assault by the 804th and K4B battalions of the NVA Fourth Regiment. (MACV Advisory Team 3, stationed here, provided fire support and logistics to ARVN's 1st Division and to Thua Thien Province forces.) The Americans manned their defenses and repulsed the initial enemy ground attack. After this the NVA no longer mounted any further ground assault, instead they turned to maintaining a siege of the compound.
Further south, beyond the Phu Cam canal and the An Cuu bridge crossing it, the K4C Battalion of the NVA Fourth Regiment set up a blocking position, while north of the city the block was Nguyen Quoc Khanh's 806th.
On the southern front, then, three enemy battalions (K-4A, K-4B, K-10) with elements of the 21st Sapper Battalion were involved.
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Wee hours
Feb 1
Feb 2
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In trying to prevent tank and armored personnel intervention, the NVA picked the Tam Thai military base (in An Cuu village) by sending three sapper units to overrun a post an the foot, one on the flank and one on top of the hill. Attacked only one month before, the base had its defense perimeters strongly reinforced. The two sapper units were repulsed with heavy casualties at the foot and on the flank of the base. Only the one on the top managed to get inside the base.
The next day, the ARVN mounted repeated assaults in order to retake the top of the hill. Many of the sappers fled, a few dozens who remained fought to the death but nonetheless were eliminated.
Hue battlefield political commissar Chien brought reinforcements to try to retake the hill but a few hours later, he was killed by a rocket. Only at night did the 818th Battalion of NVA Eighth Regiment (E.8) manage to come up and replace the remnant sappers.
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January 31
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While the sappers were trying to take Tam Thai Hill, Than Trong Mot, one of the two Communist battlefield commanders, led the NVA Fourth Regiment to cross the An Cuu River to go into Hue City itself, "detailing its 804th Battalion both to seize much of the New City itself and to attack the MACV compound."
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7:00 am
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By around 0700, the first Communist units were already in town.
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8:00 am
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0800 - The NVA raised the red-and-blue VC banner with its gold star over the Citadel flag tower. ("At 11 am on the second day of Tet, from the top of Kim Phung Peak, Brother Kinh had seen the NLF flag flying from the Hue flag tower.")
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Jan 31-
Feb 3
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The ARVN troops defending various positions in town fought back hard. It took the NVA four full days before they could occupy the ARVN 81st Ordnance Company, the Treasury, the North Central Vietnam Government Representative Building, the Thua Thien Province Administrative Hall, and the Thua Phu Prison, where they liberated 2,000 prisoners many of whom subsequently joined the battle. ("By the third day of the battle, the Thua Phu Prison was liberated, by which time we had occupied the entire city with the exception of Mang Ca and a number of pockets of resistance.")
Repulsing fierce attacks, the ARVN managed to hold on to the Thua Thien Provincial Headquarters, Hue Radio Station, and the Navy Wharves while U.S. forces fought off the enemy at MACV headquarters. Unable to take Hue Radio Station, the communists cut off power lines, effectively silencing it for a couple of days.
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Feb 1
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RESISTANCE AND COUNTERATTACK
FIRST PHASE:
Tran Ngoc Hue and his Hac Bao ("Black Panthers") joined forces with the 2nd ARVN Airborne Battalion to make the first concerted ARVN counterattack in the Citadel. After two days of hard fighting, they succeeded in recapturing Tay Loc Airfield after securing An Hoa (E) and the North (Cua Hau, D) Gates.
Meanwhile, back from fighting to the north of Hue, Pham Van Dinh's 2/3 fought sometimes house to house in an attempt to take back the New City (outside the Citadel). The NVA pulled back inside the heavily fortified Citadel to plan for a prolonged stand.
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Feb 2
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The next day, with the Quang Tri front (north of Hue) somewhat quieter, ARVN 9th Airborne Battalion commanded by Major Nha was helilifted to Mang Ca to help bolster the defense there. The main thrust of ARVN 1st Airborne Task Force, also coming from Quang Tri, fought its way inside the Citadel to relieve the Tay Loc Airfield defenders.
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Feb 3
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The ARVN Airborne troops cleared the Communist attackers from half of the airfield and retook the An Hoa Gate (E). But the other Airborne thrusts towards the Imperial Palace were blunted by intense resistance from the entrenched NVA troops
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Feb 3
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The battle seesawed with no significant movements on either side. With the injection of two fresh battalions, the NVA counterattacked and caused heavy casualties to ARVN's 4/3 Battalion.
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Feb 4
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Both sides were exhausted after five days of intense fighting, especially ARVN 1st Airborne Battalion which had taken heavy casualties in Quang Tri before joining the battle in Hue.
Nonetheless, the Airbornes assaulting the West Gate (F) found the position heavily manned by NVA troops. They had to wait until night to sneak up and fight with bayonets before they could overrun the place and hand it over to the 1st Division troops.
But the NVA situation was even more desperate. They were running out of ammunition and their artillery units were reduced to half of their strength. Over 300 wounded could not be evacuated. With the distinct possibility of U.S. reinforcements joining the battle from the south, Col. Le Minh, the NVA battlefield commander, decided to withdraw. He sent a cable to Hanoi saying that they were "out of ammunition." Hanoi sent back a cable ordering a fight to the death and promising reinforcements soon.
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Feb 5
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At the Dong Ba Gate (B), ARVN 2nd Airborne Battalion tried many times to assault the position but a powerful NVA machine gun, emplaced behind the fortified wall, mowed down the attackers. The gate was not overrun until after a direct hit from the air silenced the machine gun. The Airbornes discovered the dead body of the machine gun operator, his feet still chained to the gun.
"I and Brother Nam Long (Deputy Commander) made a battle inspection. On the north front, the ranks of political cadres and rangers did not have too many losses, only they were down on ammunition. The situation of the Sixth Regiment, however, was very serious: each rifle had [on average] only 12 to 15 bullets left, the machine guns were down to over 100 each. The artillery support was even lower, with only about half of them operational. The total number of casualties inside the Old City came to 300. On the southern front, we did not have many wounded; however, we took many prisoners, and the ammunition situation was desperate. All fronts reported to the CP [Command Post] only one concern: Ammunition! [. . .] I cabled the Joint General Staff: Please send more ammo! We are out of it. That was the fifth day."
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Feb 6
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"Only on the seventh day [of the battle] did the Americans enter the fight."
"[They] started to deploy in a big way. They brought in air cavalry and Marines, who landed at Thuan An Estuary and started moving up. They went straight for National Highway No. 1 and took it. The air cavalry retook 50 prisoners whom we have brought out from the city."
"Brother Van on the southern front could not make it [when] I called a meeting of those on the northern front: brothers Nam Long, Tran Anh Lien, Van etc. We went over the general situation: practically all the enemy positions have been destroyed, except for the puppet 1st Division in Mang Ca and isolated pockets of resistance. Thus, if our intention was to occupy the city, cause damage and boost up our political image then we have made it. But if we intend to reach a decisive victory then it's clear we are in difficulty. At this meeting we decided to propose withdrawing from the city, redirect our offensive towards the countryside and demolish the district towns. After the meeting, as we were leaving a bomb exploded exactly where we just sat, two cadres from the Military Zone were dead."
"I reported the content of our meeting to Command [presumably to Major General Tran Van Quang.- NNB]. On the other hand, I ordered the removal of war booty to our bases in the countryside and in the forest: this included rice, clothing material and much else. We had to take our wounded and prisoners out of the city during the night of the seventh day going on to the eighth."
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Feb 7
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1130 - The NVA attacked ARVN Battalion 4/3 at the West (Chanh Tay, F) Gate. Also, during the night of February 7, seeing the danger of Allied U.S.-ARVN forces coming from the right hand side of the Perfume River, the Communists blew up one span of the Truong Tien Bridge.
ARVN General Ngo Quang Truong called the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry and all three battalions of the Third Regiment to join the fight for Hue Citadel. While ARVN 2/7 fought a heavy engagement just to reach Gen. Truong's CP, the battalions of the Third Regiment, including Dinh's 2/3, made their way to ARVN 1st Division CP on boats via the Perfume River.
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Feb 8
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ARVN 9th Airborne Battalion received order to jump pass the Tinh Tam Lotus Pond to take back the Thuong Tu Gate (A), the main south gate leading directly to the Imperial Palace.
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Feb 9
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"On the tenth day, the Americans threw a floating bridge across the Perfume River to replace the Trang Tien and Bach Ho bridges that we had blown up. [In the north] Brother Ho Chi Than came back and reported: It had been decided that our troops would withdraw from Quang Tri City and that they would be redirected towards the countryside so as to eliminate the Pacification forces [of the South Vietnamese Government] and to keep the NVA regular units close by. We [therefore] determined that our battle orders had by now been accomplished, and that now Hue has become the responsibility of higher echelons."
"This time, however, brother Tran Van Quang (in charge of the Military Zone Standing Committee) himself appeared at the battlefront. He came straight to the battlefield command and rearranged the order of battle within a day (shifting around the infantry, sapper and even engineering positions). That evening he ordered a concentration of firepower using satchel charges and mortars, and gathered all our forces for a decisive push into Mang Ca Fort. But the enemy had had time to reorganize Mang Ca into a powerful base of resistance, led by no other than Ngo Quang Truong himself. We fought from 9 p.m. until midnight, incurring heavy casualties but with no result. Yet we were ordered to stay put."
On this day, the U.S. Marines pushed back the enemy at Hue University, the Athletic Field, Phu Cam and Hue Railroad Station. The NVA pulled back towards Nam Giao (Southern Esplanade).
"We cabled Headquarters: We're out of ammo. Can now plan only for one day at a time. Signed: Bay - Tin - Minh (i.e. Brother Quang, Brother Chuong - Political Commissar - and me). About five hours later, we received a cable from Hanoi: 'Higher up will send you enough reinforcements to complete the mission.' Signed: Van - Dung - Thao (i.e. Brothers Vo Nguyen Giap, Van Tien Dung and Song Hao). Another cable followed from the Joint General Staff informing us that 2 infantry regiments and 1 artillery support regiment [were on their way], and that the 559 route [i.e. logistics forces on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.- NNB] will bring the supplies of ammo and other equipment to us; also will signal when to bomb Mang Ca. This last cable was signed by Brother Van Tien Dung."
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Feb 10-15
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"After we received the cables, we went back to digging trenches and fortifications. A provincial administration was formed (with Prof. Le Van Hao as Chairman) in expectation of the arrival of the big army. We did, in fact, see an engineering regiment from the 559 come down [from the hills.- NNB] to start stringing 4-threaded power lines over poles that came all the way from on top of the Vietnamese Cordillera. Other than that, we saw nothing more until the 15th day of the battle."
"A regiment came from out there [North Vietnam] but when they reached Quang Dien, they already had to fight with the U.S. Third Marine Division even before they crossed the Bo River. After this engagement, the regiment was reduced to battalion strength, unable to make it to [Hue]."
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Feb 10
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ARVN General Headquarters further complicated the battle by recalling the severely bloodied airborne battalions, part of the GH reserve, to Saigon. Truong demanded that they be replaced by units of similar strength. GH relented and promised two battalions of Marines. Realizing that the retaking of the Imperial City would be tough, Truong insisted: MACV and ARVN decided to send a U.S. Marine infantry battalion to take part in the battle for the Citadel.
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Feb 12
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RESUMED ALLIED COUNTERATTACK
Enter the Marines:
Vietnamese Marine Brigade A was helilifted to the Imperial City to replace the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade.
1800 - A U.S. Marine unit crossed the Perfume River to land on the Bao Vinh Wharf in order to enter the back gates of the Imperial City. Major Robert Thompson's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5), accompanied by five tanks and several ONTOS tracked vehicles, each armed with four 106mm recoilless rifles, reached Truong's headquarters ready for battle.
Truong tasked the Third Regiment with retaking the southwestern portion of the Citadel, now that he had two freshly arrived Marine reinforcement battalions.
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Feb 13-20
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At dawn on February 13, the U.S. 1/5 Marines moved out to take up positions on a line that ran along Mai Thuc Loan Street from the Dong Ba Gate (B) to the northern corner of the Imperial Palace. Some confusion happened here as the ARVN Airborne had left before the U.S. Marines arrived, thus running into battle with the NVA. Bloody fighting took place in the following week as the U.S. Marines had to fight "house by house and block by torturous block." Aware that the Marines were not familiar with the terrain, Truong assigned Dinh 2/3 ARVN to the Marines' right flank.
The retaking of the southwestern portion of the Citadel was the exclusive job of the ARVN, including 1/3 ARVN and the newly arrived ARVN Marines.
In the meantime, fierce Allied artillery and air attacks targeted the La Chu area where the NVA command post was located.
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Feb 14-18
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Realizing that the ARVN advance into the southwest would cut critical logistic lines, the NVA reacted with great violence. They threw fresh reinforcements into a spoiling attack on ARVN lines near the Chanh Tay Gate (F) and cut off 1/3 ARVN. Lacking air support and heavy direct-fire weapons, and facing the brunt of enemy reinforcements, the ARVN advance was painfully slow. Tran Ngoc Hue's Hac Bao and the 2/7 Cavalry were thrown in to break the deadlock. The fighting was so bitter and confused that at one point, surrounded, Hue had to call in an air strike on his own perimeter.
Finally, on February 16, the ARVN broke through and two days later, reached the Chanh Tay Gate and the northwestern corner of the Citadel.
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Feb 18-20
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Gen. Truong sent Hue's Hac Bao to help the U.S. Marines and Dinh's 2/3 who had by then taken quite a few casualties. They doggedly fought on.
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Feb 21
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The 1/5 U.S. Marines, the 2/3 ARVN, and the Hac Bao reached the southeastern wall of the Citadel. On the opposite flank, ARVN Marines, making progress more slowly, pushed nearer to the Huu Gate (G), the last remaining entrance to the Citadel in NVA hands. Additionally, an offensive by the 3rd Brigade of the U.S. First Cavalry Division to the west of Hue City cut off the NVA from its source of supplies and reinforcements.
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Feb 15-21
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"On the 15th day, the enemy deployed four crack divisions: three American and three [ARVN] brigades, not counting the First [ARVN] division. The enemy brought bulldozers to raze villages to the ground, especially in the areas of Quang Dien [to the North of Hue] and Phu Vang [northeast of Hue]. B52s' bombing runs shook the ground all day long and our earlier command post was reduced to rubble. On the 21st day we reported the situation to the Ministry [of Defense in Hanoi.- NNB] but got no response. We decided to withdraw because even if reinforcements arrived, they would not change the situation one bit." (Emphasis added)
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Feb 22
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0630 - Isolated and facing certain destruction, the NVA launched a surprise attack through the southwest wall aimed at exhausted elements of the Third ARVN Regiment and Vietnamese Marines. Again it fell to the Hac Bao to spearhead the ARVN response. Hue rallied the dispirited ARVN and called in air strikes and artillery support against the exposed NVA caught in the open. After the fire abated, Hue and his Hac Bao charged forward, with bayonets fixed, to discover amidst the smoldering wreckage piles of NVA bodies in fresh uniforms. Prisoners interrogations revealed that they had been told, Hue was in communist hands, and that they should go in to celebrate the victory.
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Feb 23-24
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Gen. Truong gave the last and dangerous assignment to Dinh's 2/3 and Hue's Hac Bao: to assault the flag tower and take down the hated VC flag. Dinh and his American advisor chose to do a night raid to avoid the communist sharp shooters who were still desperately holding on to their last symbol.
0500 - The men of 2/3 lowered NLF banner and, after sunrise, a volunteer climbed up the battered flag pole to raise the yellow and three red stripe flag of the Republic. (John Prados was probably incorrect when he claimed that "fittingly, it was the Hac Bao (Black Panther) Company of the ARVN First Division that finally raised the South Vietnamese flag over the palace.")
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Feb 26
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"Actually, we have started withdrawing since February 22, and the withdrawal took five days before it was completed." "By February 26, we have all cleared out of [Hue] City."
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